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Abstract— A game-theoretic framework is used to study the
effect of constellation size on the energy efficiency of wireless
networks for M-QAM modulation. A non-cooperative game is
proposed in which each user seeks to choose its transmit power
(and possibly transmit symbol rate) as well as the constellation
size in order to maximize its own utility while satisfying its
delay quality-of-service (QoS) constraint. The utility function
used here measures the number of reliable bits transmitted
per joule of energy consumed, and is particularly suitable for
energy-constrained networks. The best-response strategies and
Nash equilibrium solution for the proposed game are derived.
It is shown that in order to maximize its utility (in bits per
joule), a user must choose the lowest constellation size that
can accommodate the user’s delay constraint. This strategy is
different from one that would maximize spectral efficiency. Using
this framework, the tradeoffs among energy efficiency, delay,
throughput and constellation size are also studied and quantified.
In addition, the effect of trellis-coded modulation on energy
efficiency is discussed.
Index Terms— Energy efficiency, M-QAM modulation, trellis-
coded modulation, game theory, utility function, Nash equilib-
rium, delay, quality-of-service (QoS), cross-layer design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks are expected to support a variety of ap-
plications with diverse quality-of-service (QoS) requirements.
Because of the scarcity of network resources (i.e., energy
and bandwidth), radio resource management is crucial to the
performance of wireless networks. The goal is to use the
network resources as efficiently as possible while providing
the required QoS to the users. Adaptive modulation has been
shown to be an effective method for improving the spectral
efficiency in wireless networks (see for example [1]–[4]).
However, the focus of many of the studies to date has been
on maximizing the throughput of the network, and the impact
of the modulation order on energy efficiency has not been
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studied to the same extent. Recently, the authors of [5] have
studied modulation optimization for an energy-constrained
time-division-multiple-access (TDMA) network. For such a
network, they have used a convex-optimization approach to
obtain the best modulation strategy that minimizes the total
energy consumption under throughput and delay constraints.
Game-theoretic approaches to power control have recently
attracted considerable attention (see, for example, [6]–[16]). In
[6], the authors provide motivations for using game theory to
study communication systems, and in particular power control.
In [7], power control is modeled as a non-cooperative game in
which users choose their transmit powers in order to maximize
their utilities, where utility is defined as the ratio of throughput
to transmit power. A game-theoretic approach to joint power
control and receiver design is presented in [13], and power
control for multicarrier systems is studied in [14]. The authors
in [8] use pricing to obtain a more efficient solution for the
power control game. Similar approaches are taken in [9]–[12]
for different utility functions. Game-theoretic approaches to
power control in delay-constrained networks are proposed in
[15], [16].
In this work, we use a game-theoretic approach to study the
effects of modulation on energy efficiency of code-division-
multiple-access (CDMA) networks in a competitive multiuser
setting. Focusing on M-QAM modulation, we propose a non-
cooperative game in which each user chooses its strategy,
which includes the choice of the transmit power, transmit
symbol rate and constellation size, in order to maximize its
own utility while satisfying its QoS constraints. The utility
function used here measures the number of reliable bits
transmitted per joule of energy consumed, and is particularly
suitable for energy-constrained networks. We derive the best-
response strategies and Nash equilibrium solution for the
proposed game. In addition, using our non-cooperative game-
theoretic framework, we quantify the tradeoffs among energy
efficiency, delay, throughput and modulation order. The effect
of coding on energy efficiency is also studied and quantified
using the proposed game-theoretic approach. In addition, our
framework allows us to illustrate the tradeoff between energy
efficiency and spectral efficiency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
system model and definition of the utility function are given
in Section II. We then present a power control game with no
delay constraints in Section III and derive the corresponding
2Nash equilibrium solution. A delay-constrained power con-
trol game is proposed in Section IV and the correspond-
ing best-response strategies and Nash equilibrium solution
are derived. The analysis is extended to coded systems in
Section V. Numerical results and conclusions are given in
Sections VI and VII, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a direct-sequence CDMA (DS-CDMA) wire-
less network in which the users’ terminals are transmitting to
a common concentration point (e.g., a cellular base station or
an access point). The system bandwidth is assumed to be B
Hz. Let Rs,k and pk be the symbol rate and the transmit power
for user k, respectively. In this work, we focus on M-QAM
modulation. Hence, each symbol is assumed to be complex to
represent the in-phase and quadrature components. For the M-
QAM modulation, the number of bits transmitted per symbol
is given by
b = log2M.
Since there is a one-to-one mapping between M and b, we
sometimes refer to b as the constellation size. We focus on
square M-QAM modulation, i.e., M ∈ {4, 16, 64, · · · } or
equivalently b ∈ {2, 4, 6, · · · }, since there are exact expres-
sions for the symbol error probability of square M-QAM
modulation (see [17]). We can easily generalize our analysis
to include odd values of b by using an approximate expression
for the symbol error probability.
We define the utility function of a user as the ratio of its
throughput to its transmit power, i.e.,
uk =
Tk
pk
. (1)
This utility function is similar to the one used in [7] and [8].
Throughput in (1) is defined as the net number of information
bits that are transmitted without error per unit time (it is
sometimes referred to as goodput), and is expressed as
Tk = Rkf(γk) (2)
where Rk = bkRs,k is the transmission rate, γk is the output
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) for user k, and
f(γk) is the “efficiency function” which represents the packet
success rate (PSR) for the kth user. We require that f(0) = 0
to ensure that uk = 0 when pk = 0. In general, the efficiency
function depends on the modulation, coding and packet size.
We assume an automatic-repeat-request (ARQ) mechanism in
which the user keeps retransmitting a packet until the packet
is received at the access point without any errors. Based on
(1) and (2), the utility function for user k can be written as
uk = Rk
f(γk)
pk
. (3)
This utility function, which has units of bits/joule, measures
the number of reliable bits that are transmitted per joule
of energy consumed, and is particularly suitable for energy-
constrained networks.
Let us for now focus on a specific user and drop the
subscript k. Assuming a packet size of L bits, the packet
success rate for square M-QAM modulation is given by
Psuccess(b, γ) =
(
1− αbQ(
√
βbγ)
) 2L
b (4)
where
αb = 2
(
1− 2−b/2
)
, (5)
and
βb =
3
2b − 1 . (6)
Here, γ represents the symbol SIR and Q(·) is the com-
plementary cumulative distribution function of the standard
Gaussian random variable. Note that at γ = 0, we have
Psuccess = 2
−L 6= 0. Since we require the efficiency function
to be zero at zero transmit power, we define
fb(γ) =
(
1− αbQ(
√
βbγ)
) 2L
b − 2−L. (7)
Note that 2−L ≃ 0 when L is large (e.g., L = 100).
A non-cooperative power control game, in general, can be
expressed as G = [K, {Ak}, {uk}] where K = {1, ...,K} is
the set of users/players, Ak is the strategy set for the kth
user, and uk is the utility function given by (3). Each user
decides what strategy to choose from its strategy set in order to
maximize its own utility. Hence, the best-response (i.e. utility-
maximizing) strategy of user k is given by the solution of
max
ak∈Ak
uk ≡ max
ak∈Ak
Rk
f(γk)
pk
. (8)
For this game, a Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies
(a∗1, · · · , a∗K) such that no user can unilaterally improve its
own utility [18], that is,
uk(a
∗
k, a
∗
−k) ≥ uk(ak, a∗−k), for all ak ∈ Ak and k = 1, · · · ,K.
(9)
In this work, we propose non-cooperative games in which
the actions open to each user are the choice of transmit power,
and possibly transmit symbol rate, as well as the choice of
constellation size.
III. POWER CONTROL GAME WITH M-QAM
MODULATION
Consider a DS-CDMA network with K users and express
the transmission rate of user k as
Rk = bkRs,k (10)
where bk is the number of information bits per symbol and
Rs,k is the symbol rate. Let us for now assume that users
have no delay constraints. We propose a power control game
in which each user seeks to choose its constellation size and
transmit power in order to maximize its own utility, i.e.,
max
bk,pk
Rk
fbk(γk)
pk
for k = 1, · · · ,K, (11)
where bk ∈ {2, 4, 6, · · · } and pk ∈ [0, Pmax] with Pmax being
the maximum allowed transmit power. Throughout this work,
we assume Pmax is large.
3For all linear receivers, the output SIR for user k can be
written as
γk = (B/Rs,k)pk hˆk (12)
where B is the system bandwidth and hˆk is the effective
channel gain which depends on the channel gain of user k
and on the channel gains and transmit powers of other users
in the network but is independent of the transmit power and
rate of user k. For example, for a matched-filter receiver, hˆk
is given by
hˆk =
hk
σ2 +
∑
j 6=k pjhj
,
where hk is the channel gain for user k, and σ2 is the noise
power. Therefore, the utility function in (3) can be written as
uk = Bhˆk bk
fbk(γk)
γk
. (13)
Based on (13), and by dropping the subscript k for conve-
nience, the maximization in (11) can be written as
max
b,γ
Bhˆ b
fb(γ)
γ
. (14)
Since for a given user, B and hˆ are fixed, maximizing the
user’s utility is equivalent to maximizing bfb(γ)/γ for that
user. It is important to observe that, for a given b, specifying
the operating SIR completely specifies the utility function. Let
us for now fix the symbol rate Rs and the constellation size.
Taking the derivative of (14) with respect to γ and equating
it to zero, we conclude that the utility of a user is maximized
when its output SIR, γ, is equal to γ∗b , which is the (positive)
solution of
fb(γ) = γf
′
b(γ). (15)
It is shown in [19] that for an S-shaped1 (sigmoidal) efficiency
function, f(γk) = γk f ′(γk) has a unique solution. It can
easily be verified that fb(γ) given by (7) is S-shaped. Note
that γ∗b is (uniquely) determined by physical-layer parameters
such as packet size, modulation, and coding.
Assuming that γ∗b is feasible, the maximum utility is hence
given by
u∗b = Bhˆ b
fb(γ
∗
b )
γ∗b
. (16)
Based on (7), it can be shown that γ∗b is (approximately) given
by the solution of
αbL
b
√
βbγ
2π
e−
βbγ
2 + αbQ(
√
βbγ) = 1.
We can compute γ∗b numerically for different values of b.
Table I summarizes the results for a system with L = 100
bits (i.e., 100 bits per packet). It is observed from Table I that
the user’s utility is maximized when b = 2 (i.e., QPSK mod-
ulation). This is because, as b increases, the linear increase in
the throughput is dominated by the exponential increase in the
required transmit power (which results from the exponential
increase in γ∗b ). Therefore, it is best for a user to use QPSK
modulation.2 Figs. 1 and 2 show the efficiency function and
1An increasing function is S-shaped if there is a point above which the
function is concave, and below which the function is convex.
2BPSK and QPSK are equivalent in terms of energy efficiency, but QPSK
has a higher spectral efficiency.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE PARAMETERS CORRESPONDING TO THE
UTILITY-MAXIMIZING SOLUTIONS FOR DIFFERENT MODULATION ORDERS
FOR AN UNCODED SYSTEM WITH 100 BITS PER PACKET
b αb βb γ
∗
b
(dB) fb(γ∗b ) b/γ∗b (dB) bfb(γ∗b )/γ∗b
2 1 1 9.1 0.801 -6.1 0.1978
4 1.5 0.2 15.7 0.785 -9.7 0.0846
6 1.75 0.0476 21.6 0.771 -13.8 0.0322
8 1.875 0.0118 27.3 0.757 -18.3 0.0112
10 1.9375 0.0029 33.0 0.743 -23.0 0.0037
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Fig. 1. Efficiency function (packet success rate) as a function of SIR for
different constellation sizes.
the normalized user utility (i.e., ub
Bhˆ
) as a function of the SIR
for different choices of b.
It can be shown that if γ∗b is not feasible, the user’s utility
is maximized when the transmit power is equal to Pmax (see
[8] and [13]). Now, if we assume that Pmax is large, then
for a matched filter receiver, in order for users 1, · · · ,K
to achieve output SIRs equal to γ1,· · · ,γK , respectively, the
transmit powers must be equal to
pk =
σ2
hk
(
Φk
1−∑Kj=1 Φj
)
, (17)
where
Φk =
(
1 +
B
Rs,kγk
)−1
, (18)
for k = 0, · · · ,K . Therefore, γ1,· · · ,γK are feasible if and
only if
K∑
k=1
(
1 +
B
Rs,kγk
)−1
< 1.
So far, we have shown that at Nash equilibrium (if it exists),
QPSK modulation must be used by each user (otherwise a
user can always improve its utility by switching to QPSK
and reducing its transmit power), and each user’s transmit
power is chosen to achieve the γ∗ corresponding to the QPSK
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Fig. 2. Normalized user utility as a function of SIR for different constellation
sizes.
modulation at the output of the receiver (i.e., 9.1dB according
to Table I). The existence of the Nash equilibrium for the pro-
posed game can be shown via the quasiconcavity of each user’s
utility function in its own power [18]. Furthermore, because
of the uniqueness of γ∗ and the one-to-one correspondence
between the transmit power and the output SIR (see (17)),
this equilibrium is unique.3
In addition, we observe that the energy-efficient strategy
is not spectrally-efficient. Incorporating the choice of the
modulation order into our utility maximization allows us to
trade off energy efficiency with spectral efficiency. For the
same bandwidth and symbol rate, as a user switches to a
higher-order modulation, the spectral efficiency for the user
improves but its energy efficiency degrades.
IV. DELAY-CONSTRAINED POWER AND RATE CONTROL
GAME WITH M-QAM MODULATION
In Section III, we showed that for our utility function, it
is best for a user to use the lowest-order modulation. We
now extend the analysis to the case in which the users have
delay QoS requirements. Our goal in this part is to study the
effects of constellation size on energy efficiency and delay.
We consider a game in which each user seeks to choose its
transmit power, symbol rate and constellation size to maximize
its own utility while satisfying its delay QoS constraint. The
delay QoS constraint considered here is in terms of the average
delay and includes both transmission and queuing delays.
More discussion on the delay performance can be found in
[16]. It should be noted that an average-delay constraint may
not be sufficient for applications with hard delay requirements
(see [20]).
3Please note that throughout this paper, SIR refers to the output signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio. Based on (17) and (18), specifying the SIRs of
the users uniquely determines their transmit powers and vice versa.
µ   (pps)
 k
λ   (pps)
k
Fig. 3. System model based on an M/G/1 queue.
A. Delay Model
Let us assume that the incoming packets for user k have a
Poisson distribution with parameter λk which represents the
average packet arrival rate with each packet consisting of L
bits. The source rate (in bits per second) is hence given by
Lλk. The user transmits the arriving packets at a rate Rk =
bkRs,k (bps) and with a transmit power equal to pk Watts. We
assume an ARQ mechanism for packet transmission. Also,
the incoming packets are assumed to be stored in a queue and
transmitted in a first-in-first-out (FIFO) fashion. The packet
success probability (per transmission) as before is represented
by the efficiency function fb(γ).
Focusing on a specific user and dropping the subscript k, we
can represent the combination of the user’s queue and wireless
link as an M/G/1 queue (as shown in Fig. 3) where the service
time, S, has the following probability mass function (PMF):
Pr{S = mτ} = fb(γ) (1− fb(γ))m−1 for m = 1, 2, · · ·
(19)
with τ being the packet transmission time which is given by
τ =
L
bRs
+ ǫ ≃ L
bRs
. (20)
Here, ǫ represents the time taken for the user to receive an
ACK/NACK from the access point. We assume ǫ is negligible
compared to LbRs . Based on (19), the service rate, µ, is given
by
µ =
1
E{S} =
fb(γ)
τ
= Rs
bfb(γ)
L
, (21)
and the load factor ρ = λµ =
λτ
fb(γ)
. Therefore, the average
service rate is affected by the constellation size through a
linear factor b as well as the efficiency function fb(γ). To
keep the queue stable, we must have ρ < 1 or fb(γ) > λτ .
Now, let W be a random variable representing the total
packet delay for the user. The delay includes both transmission
and queuing delays. Using the Pollaczek-Khintchine formula
for the M/G/1 queue considered here, the average packet delay
is given by (see [21])
W¯ = τ
(
1− λτ2
fb(γ)− λτ
)
with fb(γ) > λτ. (22)
We specify the delay QoS constraint of a user by an upper
bound on the average packet delay, i.e., we require
W¯ ≤ D. (23)
5This delay constraint can equivalently be expressed as
fb(γ) ≥ ηb (24)
where
ηb =
Lλ
bRs
+
L
bRsD
− L
2λ
2b2R2sD
. (25)
Note that (24) is equivalent to the condition
γ ≥ γˆb
where
γˆb = f
−1
b (ηb) . (26)
Based on (7), γˆb is given by
γˆb ≃ 1
βb
[
Q−1
(
1− ηb/2L
αb
)]2
. (27)
This means that the delay constraint in (23) translates into a
lower bound on the output SIR. It should be noted that since
the upper bound on the average delay must be at least as
large as the transmission time, i.e., D ≥ τ , we must have that
bRs ≥ L/D. This automatically implies that ηb > 0. Also,
since 0 ≤ fb(γ) ≤ 1, (24) is possible only if ηb < 1.4
B. The Proposed Game
We propose a game in which each user chooses its transmit
power and symbol rate as well as its constellation size in
order to maximize its own utility while satisfying its delay
requirement. Fixing the other users’ transmit powers and rates,
the best-response strategy for the user of interest is given by
the solution of the following constrained maximization:
max
p,Rs,b
u s.t. W¯ ≤ D , (28)
or equivalently
max
γ,Rs,b
b
fb(γ)
γ
s.t. γ ≥ γˆb and 0 ≤ ηb < 1 . (29)
Proposition 1: For a fixed b, the source rate λ and the delay
constraint D are feasible if and only if
Lλ
bB
+
L
bBD
− L
2λ
2b2B2D
< 1 , (30)
where B is the system bandwidth.
Proof: For λ and D to be feasible, we must have ηb <
1 where ηb is given by (25). Also, since ηb is a decreasing
function of Rs, the lowest possible value of ηb is achieved
when Rs = B. Hence, it is straightforward to see that the
source rate λ and the delay constraint D are feasible if and
only if (30) is satisfied.
Remember that D cannot be smaller than τ . Hence, it can
be shown that the condition 0 ≤ ηb < 1 is equivalent to
Rs > Ω
∞/b where
Ω∞ =
(
L
D
)
1 +Dλ+
√
1 +D2λ2
2
.
4Note that f(γ) = 1 requires an infinite SIR which is not practical.
Also, let us define Ω∗b as the rate for which γˆb = γ∗b , i.e.,
Ω∗b =
(
L
D
)
1 +Dλ+
√
1 +D2λ2 + 2(1− f∗b )Dλ
2f∗b
(31)
where f∗b = fb(γ∗b ).
Proposition 2: For given values of λ and D, the best-
response strategy for a user (i.e., the solution of (28)) is any
combination of p and Rs such that
min
{
Ω∗
b˜
/b˜, B
}
≤ Rs ≤ B (32)
and
γ =
{
γ∗
b˜
, if Ω∗
b˜
/b˜ ≤ B;
γˆb˜, if Ω∗b˜/b˜ > B,
(33)
where b˜ is the lowest constellation size for which λ and D are
feasible, γ∗b is the solution of (15), and γˆb is given by (26).
Proof of Proposition 2 requires the following lemma.
Lemma 1: If ηb > 2−L, then γˆb is an increasing function
of b and the increase is exponential.
Proof: Let us define xb ≡ 1−η
b/2L
αb
. Given (5), we can
express xb as
xb =
1
2

1−
(
η
1/2L
b
)b
1− (1/√2)b

 . (34)
Define ηˆb ≡ η1/2Lb . If ηb > 2−L, then ηˆb > 1/
√
2. Now, if
b′ > b′′, then, it is easy to show that
1− (ηˆb′′ )b′
1− (1/√2)b′ >
1− (ηˆb′′)b′′
1− (1/√2)b′′ .
Also, since ηb′ < ηb′′ , we have
1− (ηˆb′ )b′
1− (1/√2)b′ >
1− (ηˆb′′)b′
1− (1/√2)b′ .
As a result,
1− (ηˆb′)b′
1− (1/√2)b′ >
1− (ηˆb′′)b′′
1− (1/√2)b′′ ,
which implies that xb is an increasing function of b. According
to (27), we have
γˆb = (1/βb)
[
Q−1(xb)
]2
.
Since xb is an increasing function of b, and βb is a decreasing
function of b, γˆb is an increasing function of b. Furthermore,
since
[
Q−1(xb)
]2 is increasing in b and 1/βb = (2b − 1)/3
is exponentially increasing in b, γˆb is also exponentially
increasing in b.
The ηb > 2−L assumption is consistent with good design
practice. In particular, since ηb represents the packet success
probability, ηb ≤ 2−L would correspond to a very poorly-
designed system. In fact, in such a case, there would not be
any need to transmit the packets since random guessing at the
receiver would give a PSR of 2−L. We now give the proof for
Proposition 2.
Proof: [Proof of Proposition 2] We showed in Section III
that for the unconstrained optimization problem and for a fixed
6b, the utility is maximized when the user’s SIR is equal to γ∗b
which is the solution of fb(γ) = γf ′b(γ). It is straightforward
to show that γˆb is a decreasing function of Rs for all Rs ≥
Ω∞/b. Therefore, for all Ω∞/b ≤ Rs < Ω∗b/b, γˆb > γ∗b .
This means that based on (13), a user has no incentive to
transmit at a symbol rate smaller than Ω∗b/b. Hence, for a
fixed constellation size, any combination of p and Rs ≥ Ω∗b/b
that results in an output SIR equal to γ∗b maximizes the utility
and satisfies the delay constraint. If Ω∗b/b > B, then γˆb cannot
be made equal to γ∗b . In this case, the user must transmit at the
maximum symbol rate (i.e., Rs = B) and choose its transmit
power such that γ = γˆb > γ∗b in order to meet its delay
constraint.
Now let us include the effect of constellation size. Let b′ >
b′′ and consider the following cases.
• If Ω∗b′′/b′′ ≤ B, then we will have Ω∗b′/b′ ≤ B. This
means both γ∗b′ and γ∗b′′ are feasible. However, the user’s
utility will drop if the user moves to a higher-order
modulation. This is because the linear gain in utility
due to an increase in b is dominated by the exponential
increase in the optimum operating SIR as shown in
Section III. Therefore, in this case, the user would choose
the smallest b.
• If Ω∗b′′/b′′ > B but λ and D are feasible with b′′ (see
Proposition 1), then the user’s utility is maximized when
the symbol rate is equal to B and the SIR is equal to
γˆb′′ . On the other hand, the user can switch to b′ > b′′.
In that case, γˆb′ is smallest when the symbol rate is equal
to B. However, based on Lemma 1, with Rs = B and
b′ > b′′, we have γˆb′ > γˆb′′ . Furthermore, the increase in
γˆb is exponential. Since the exponential increase in the
SIR would dominate the linear increase in the rate caused
by an increase in b, it is best for the user to use b′′ (i.e.,
the smaller constellation size).
• If Ω∗b′′/b′′ > B and λ and D are not feasible, the user
must switch to a higher constellation size and a similar
argument as above would follow.
Therefore, the user must always choose the lowest constella-
tion size for which the user’s QoS constraint can be satisfied.
Proposition 2 implies that, in terms of energy efficiency,
choosing the lowest-order modulation (i.e., QPSK) is the best
strategy unless the user’s delay constraint is too tight. In other
words, the user would jump to a higher-order modulation
only when it is transmitting at the highest symbol rate (i.e.,
Rs = B) and still cannot meet the delay requirement. Also, the
proposition suggests that if Ω∗
b˜
/b˜ < B, the user has infinitely
many best-response strategies. In particular, the user chooses
the lowest constellation size that can accommodate the delay
constraint. Then, for that constellation, any combination of pk
and Rs,k for which γk = γ∗bk and Rs,k ≥ Ω∗bk/b is a best-
response strategy.
C. Nash Equilibrium
At Nash equilibrium, the transmit powers, symbol rates and
constellation sizes of all the users have to satisfy Proposition 2
simultaneously. There are, therefore, cases where we have
infinitely many Nash equilibria. For a matched filter, for
example, the best-response transmit power of user k is given
by
pk =
σ2
hk
(
Φk
1−∑Kj=1 Φj
)
, (35)
where
Φk =
(
1 +
B
Rs,kγk
)−1
, (36)
and γk and Rs,k are determined according to Proposition 2
for k = 1, · · · ,K . We refer to Φk as “size” of user k. Φk is a
measure of the amount of network resources that is consumed
by the kth user.5 Note that Rs,k’s and γk’s are feasible if and
only if
K∑
j=1
Φj < 1. (37)
Combining (3) with (35), the utility of user k at Nash
equilibrium is given by
uk =
Bf(γk)hk
σ2γk
(
1−
∑
j 6=k Φj
1− Φk
)
. (38)
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium with the smallest Rs,k
achieves the largest utility. A higher symbol rate (i.e., smaller
processing gain) for a user requires a larger transmit power
by that user to achieve the required SIR. This causes more
interference for other users in the network and forces them
to raise their transmit powers as well. As a result, the level
of interference in the system increases and the users’ utilities
decrease. This means that the Nash equilibrium with Rs,k =
min{Ω∗
b˜k
/b˜k, B} and pk given by (35) for k = 1, · · · ,K is
the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium.
As the delay constraint of a user becomes tighter, according
to Proposition 2, the user will increase its symbol rate. This
results in an increase in the user’s “size”. When the symbol
rate becomes equal to the system bandwidth, the user will
increase its SIR which again results in an increase in Φ.
Finally, when the user’s delay constraint is not feasible any-
more, the user will switch to a higher constellation size. This
results in an exponential increase in the required SIR, which
dominates the linear decrease in the symbol rate. Therefore, Φ
increases again. This shows that the user’s “size” increases as
the delay requirement becomes more stringent. The feasibility
condition given by (37) determines the maximum number of
users that can be accommodated by the network. A tighter
delay constraint results in a larger “size’ for the user. This, in
turn, results in a smaller network capacity.
V. POWER CONTROL GAMES WITH TRELLIS-CODED
M-QAM MODULATION
So far, we have focused on an uncoded system. In this
section, we extend our analysis to trellis-coded modulation
(TCM). We consider a trellis-coded M-QAM system in which
b information bits are divided into two groups of size n
and b − n bits, respectively. The first group (with size n)
5Φk here is a generalized version of the definition that has been given in
[16].
7is convolutionally encoded into ℓ bits which are used by the
coset selector to choose one of the 2ℓ constellation subsets.
The remaining b− n bits are used to choose one of the 2b−n
signal points in the selected subset (see [22] for more details).
The code rate is hence given by θc = n/ℓ and the constellation
size is increased from 2b to 2ℓ+b−n. It is common to use a
code rate of θc = n/(n+ 1) for subset selection. For b > 2,
n = 2 is usually a good choice.6
For trellis-coded modulation (TCM), the efficiency function
(which represents the packet success probability) is given by
f
(c)
b (γ) ≃
(
1− αbQ(
√
βbγGb(γ))
) 2L
b − 2−L, (39)
where b is the number of information bits per symbol and
Gb(·) is the effective coding gain which in general is a func-
tion of SIR and also depends on the modulation level. Recall
that in our proposed game, each user chooses its transmit
power, symbol rate and modulation level to maximize its own
utility function while satisfying its delay constraint. One could
potentially follow the same analysis for the coded system as
the one presented for the uncoded system by replacing fb(γ)
with f (c)b (γ) given in (39). For the coded case, the delay-
constrained utility maximization can be written as
max
γ,Rs,b
b
f
(c)
b (γ)
γ
s.t. γ ≥ γˆb and 0 ≤ ηb < 1 , (40)
where γˆ(c)b = f
(c)−1
b (ηb). Therefore, the solution of this
maximization is heavily dependent on the efficiency function
given in (39). While the coding gain can be assumed to be
constant in the limit of very large SIRs, the dependence of G
on γ and b is important for our optimization problem. Since
there are no closed-form expressions for Gb(γ), we can use
the BER curves available in the literature (for example in [3])
to estimate the coding gain as a function of γ for different
modulation levels. Then, using these discrete values, we can
approximate the shape of Gb(γ) for different values of b. We
have found that the following function gives us a reasonable
estimate for G:
Gˆb(γ) = Ab + Cb tan
−1
(
γ − γ¯b
Db
)
, (41)
where Ab, Cb, Db, and γ¯b are constants that only depend on
the modulation level and can be determined by trial and error.
The function in (41) is plotted in Fig. 4 for different values
of b for an 8-state convolutional encoder with rate 2/3. The
piece-wise linear curves obtained from the BER plots are also
shown.
Based on the analysis that was done for uncoded systems,
the best-response strategy of a user in a coded system and the
achieved utility at Nash equilibrium depend on γ∗(c)b , which is
the solution of f (c)b (γ) = γf
′(c)
b (γ), and on γˆ
(c)
b = f
(c)−1
b (ηb).
We use the approximation given by (41) for the coding gain
in the expression for the efficiency function given by (39).
While obtaining closed-form expressions for γ∗(c)b and γˆ
(c)
b is
difficult, we can compute them numerically. Table II compares
the optimum SIRs and the corresponding packet success
6For b = 2, n is equal to one.
0 10 20 30 40 50
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
SIR (dB)
C
od
in
g 
G
ai
n 
(d
B)
b=2 
b=4 
b=6 
b=8
b=10 
Fig. 4. Coding gain as a function of SIR for an 8-state convolutional encoder
with rate 2/3. The solid lines are the estimates based on Gˆb and the dashed
lines are piece-wise linear estimates based on the data obtained from the BER
curves.
probabilities and utilities of the uncoded and coded systems
for different values of b and with no delay constraints.7 It
is seen from the table that the target SIR (i.e., γ∗) is lower
in a coded system. Also, comparing the fourth and seventh
columns of Table II, we see that coding improves user’s utility
(i.e., energy efficiency).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we quantify the effect of constellation size
on energy efficiency of a user with a delay QoS constraint.
The packet size is assumed to be 100 bits, and the source
rate (in bps) for the user is assumed to be equal to 0.01B
where B is the system bandwidth. We further assume that a
user chooses its constellation size, symbol rate, and transmit
power according to its best-response strategy corresponding
to the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium (see Section IV-C).
For the coded system, we assume an 8-state convolutional
encoder with rate 2/3. The code rate for QPSK is chosen to
be 1/2. Fig. 5 shows the optimum constellation size, transmit
power, throughput, and user’s utility as a function of the delay
constraint for both uncoded and coded systems. The results for
the coded case are obtained by using (41) as an approximation
for the coding gain. For all four plots, the packet delay is
normalized by the inverse of the system bandwidth. To keep
the spectral efficiency of the two systems the same, we assume
that the number of information bits transmitted per symbol is
the same for both uncoded and coded systems. The throughput
corresponds to the transmission rate for the user which is
obtained by multiplying the symbol rate by the number of
(information) bits per symbol (i.e., b), and is normalized by
7Optimum here refers to the best-response strategy (i.e., the most energy-
efficient solution).
8TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN CODED AND UNCODED SYSTEMS
b γ∗
b
(dB) fb(γ∗b ) bfb(γ∗b )/γ∗b γ
∗(c)
b
(dB) f(c)
b
(γ
∗(c)
b
) bf
(c)
b
(γ
∗(c)
b
)/γ
∗(c)
b
2 9.1 0.801 0.1978 8.1 0.947 0.2914
4 15.7 0.785 0.0846 14.2 0.898 0.1357
6 21.6 0.771 0.0322 20.4 0.872 0.0448
8 27.3 0.757 0.0112 26.3 0.847 0.160
10 33.0 0.743 0.0037 31.9 0.788 0.0051
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Fig. 5. Optimum modulation level, transmit power, throughput, and utility
as a function of (normalized) packet delay.
the system bandwidth. The transmit power and user’s utility
are also normalized by hˆ and Bhˆ, respectively.
Let us for now focus on the uncoded system. When the delay
constraint is large, QPSK (which is the most energy efficient
M-QAM modulation) can accommodate the delay requirement
and hence is chosen by the user. As the delay constraint
becomes tighter, the user increases its symbol rate and also
raises the transmit power to keep the output SIR at 9.1 dB
(recall that γ∗b = 9.1 dB when b = 2). In this case, the user’s
utility stays constant. Once the symbol rate becomes equal to
the system bandwidth, the user cannot increase it anymore.
Hence, as the delay constraint becomes more stringent, the
user is forced to aim for a higher target SIR to meet its
delay requirement. In this case, the transmission rate stays
constant and the transmit power increases. Hence, the user’s
utility decreases. As the delay requirement becomes tighter,
a point is reached where the spectral efficiency of QPSK is
not enough to accommodate the delay constraint. In this case,
the user jumps to a higher-order modulation (i.e., 16-QAM)
and the process repeats itself. The trends are similar for the
coded system except that, due to coding gain, the required
transmit power is smaller for the coded system. This results
in an increase in the user’s utility. This means that, for the
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Fig. 6. Gain in utility due to TCM as a function of (normalized) packet
delay.
same number of information bits transmitted per symbol, the
energy efficiency is higher when TCM is used. In addition,
in Fig. 6, we have plotted the utility gain achieved due to
TCM as a function of normalized packet delay. It is seen that
the gain in energy efficiency due to TCM depends on the
delay constraint and fluctuates between 1.5 dB and 3 dB. In
general, for the same delay constraint, the uncoded system
has to transmit at a slightly higher symbol rate as compared
to the coded system. This is because f∗(c)b > f∗b (see Table II).
As a result, Ω∗(c)b < Ω∗b . The spikes in Fig. 6 correspond to
the cases in which the uncoded system is transmitting at the
maximum possible symbol rate and has to increase its target
SIR to meet the delay constraint. This results in a drop in the
utility of the uncoded system. The coded system may still be
able to meet the delay constraint without increasing the target
SIR.
Fig. 7 shows the user’s “size”, Φ, corresponding to the
Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium as a function of the packet
delay for both uncoded and coded systems. As explained in
Section IV-C, Φ increases as the delay constraint becomes
tighter. This makes sense because a user would need to
consume more network resources to satisfy a more stringent
delay. It is also seen that coding reduces the user’s “size”
and, hence, increases the network capacity. This is because
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Fig. 7. User’s “size”, Φ, corresponding to the Pareto-dominant Nash
equilibrium as a function of (normalized) packet delay.
for the same constellation size, the symbol rate and the SIR
are smaller for the coded system.
We have seen throughout this paper that the strategy that
maximizes the user’s energy efficiency is not spectrally ef-
ficient. To illustrate the energy efficiency-spectral efficiency
tradeoff, let us fix the symbol rate to be 0.01B. For a
fixed constellation size, the user’s utility (energy efficiency)
is proportional to bf(γ∗b )/γ∗b . The spectral efficiency is given
by bRs/B. By varying the constellation size, we can quantify
the tradeoff between energy efficiency and spectral efficiency.
This tradeoff is shown in Fig. 8 for both uncoded and coded
systems. In this figure, we have plotted bf(γ∗b )/γ∗b vs. bRs/B.
Different points on the plot correspond to different values of b.
The energy efficiency-spectral efficiency tradeoff is definitely
an interesting and important topic that requires more in-depth
analysis.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the effects of modulation order on energy
efficiency of wireless networks using a game-theoretic frame-
work. Focusing on M-QAM modulation, we have proposed a
non-cooperative game in which each user chooses its strategy
in order to maximize its utility while satisfying its delay QoS
constraint. The actions open to the users are the choice of
the transmit power, transmit symbol rate and constellation
size. The utility function measures the number of reliable bits
transmitted per joule of energy consumed and is particularly
suitable for energy-constrained networks. The best-response
strategies and the Nash equilibrium solution for the proposed
game have been derived. We have shown that to maximize
its utility (i.e., energy efficiency), the user must choose the
lowest modulation level that can accommodate the user’s delay
constraint. Using our non-cooperative game-theoretic frame-
work, the tradeoffs among energy efficiency, delay, throughput
and constellation size have also been studied and quantified.
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Fig. 8. Tradeoff between spectral efficiency and energy efficiency.
In addition, we have included the effects of TCM and have
shown that, as expected, coding increases energy efficiency.
The tradeoff between energy efficiency and spectral efficiency
has also been illustrated.
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